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POLITICAL BROADCASTING AFTER THE 
ASPEN RULING: LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF 
SECTION 315(a) OF THE COMMUNICATIONS 
ACT OF 1934 
Stuart N. Brotman* 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commis-
sion), responding in 1975 to a petition filed by the Aspen Insti-
tute's Program on Communications and Society, expressly re-
versed two of its prior decisions that limited the scope of the 
exemptions of section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934.1 
These prior decisions, The Goodwill Stations, Inc. (WJR) 2 and 
National Broadcasting Co., Inc. (NBC (Wyckof/))3 involved 
• B.S., Northwestern University; M.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., University of 
California (Berkeley); Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Com-
munications and Information, National Telecommunications and Information Adminis-
tration; Member, State Bar of California. 
The views presented herein are solely those of the author, and are not intended to 
represent the position of the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion. 
1 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). Section 315(a) states: 
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for 
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal qpportunities 
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: 
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material 
broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed under this 
subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. 
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any -
(1) bona fide newscast, 
(2) bona fide news interview, 
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is inci-
dental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documen-
tary), or 
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited 
to political conventions and activities incidental thereto), 
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this 
subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving 
broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, 
news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation 
imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public interest and to 
afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of 
public importance. 
2 40 F.C.C. 362 (1962). 
s 40 F.C.C. 370 (1962). 
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broadcast coverage of political debates staged by nonbroadcast 
organizations, the Economic Club of Detroit and the convention 
of the United Press International, respectively. The FCC held 
that both programs triggered the equal opportunities provision 
for political candidates embodied in section 315(a) and that they 
did not fall within one of that section's four exemptions. 4 
The Aspen Institute's petition sought a revision or clarification 
of the Commission's policies concerning the applicability of sec-
tion 315(a) to joint appearances by candidates before nonbroad-
cast groups. 5 The Aspen Institute argued successfully that such 
appearances should be exempt from the equal opportunities re-
quirement, since under a broad construction of one of the legisla-
tive exemptions, they could be characterized as on-the-spot cov-
erage of a bona fide news event. 8 
The FCC's new interpretation of section 315(a) in the Aspen 
ruling greatly reduced its inhibitory effect on broadcasters. The 
ruling, however, has created further interpretive problems regard-
ing the broadcast debate format, and has not completely resolved 
the more general problem of giving the electorate greater and 
more direct exposure to candidates during campaigns through 
programming that forces candidates to confront each other on the 
major issues. This article will discuss the. background of section 
315(a),7 then explain each of its exemptions. Finally, it will pro-
pose possible reforms in the area of political broadcasting in light 
of the Aspen ruling. 
I. SECTION 315(a) AND ITS EXEMPTIONS 
Section 315(a) requires a broadcast licensee to afford precisely 
equal opportunities to all legally qualified candidates for a given 
public office if it permits any candidate for such office a "use" of 
t_he station. 8 It is applicable to state and local as well as to federal 
• See note 1 supra. 
' CBS, Inc. filed a separate petition requesting a declaratory ruling that presidential 
press conferences are exempt for the equal opportunities provision. Aspen Inst. Program 
on Communication and Soc'y, 55 F.C.C.2d 697, 698 (1975), aff'd sub. nom Chisholm v. 
FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). 
• Id. at 703-08. 
1 See generally Note, FCC Implementation of the Section 315(a): The Disappearance 
of the Equal Time Doctrine, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 70 (1976); 10 CONN. L. REv. 236 (1977). 
• As a general rule, any "use," however slight, of broadcast facilities by a legally quali-
fied candidate imposes an obligation on broadcasters to afford equal opportunities to all 
other candidates for the same office. Thus, if a candidate's voice or image appears in a 
readily identifiable manner, even if only for a brief period, a "use" has occurred. See, e.g., 
Harry M. Plotkin, 23 F.C.C.2d 758 (1966); cf. National Urban Coalition, 23 F.C.C.2d 123 
(1970) (incidental appearance of future gubernatorial candidate in which he was not 
"readily identifiable" did not constitute a "use" under § 315(a)). 
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elections. 9 The phrase "equal opportunities" comprises both 
equal free use of air time, if one candidate receives any free time, 
and the right to purchase air time at rates'° and times comparable 
to those offered to other candidates for the same office. 11 There 
are four instances in which a station is not required to provide an 
equal opportunity even though a use has occurred. Exemptions 
are provided when a candidate appears in any (1) bona fide news-
cast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide news documen-
tary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the pres-
entation of the subject or subjects), or (4) on-the-spot coverage 
of bona fide news events. 12 Any program in one of these categories 
does not trigger an equal opportunities obligation, although the 
station· must still comply with the general fairness doctrine. 13 
The underlying legislative objectives of section 315(a) are two-
fold and tend to contradict each other. The first objective of 
section 315(a) is to provide the public with maximum access to 
the views of all candidates; that is, to promote the necessary 
wide-open debate required for an informed electorate under the 
First Amendment. 14 The second objective is to encourage fairness 
in the political process by requiring that broadcasters give equal 
opportunities to those seeking the same office. In practice, how-
ever, insuring equal opportunities for all candidates often has 
resulted in a licensee's decision not to afford free time for presen-
tations by the major candidates where there are a number of 
minor party candidates who have a mandatory right to free time. 
• See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 
(1959). 
1• The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 103(a)(l), 86 Stat. 
7 (1972), amended § 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 to require that the charges 
made for the use of a broadcasting station by any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office cannot, during the forty-five days preceding a primary election 
and during the sixty days preceding a general or special election, exceed the lowest unit 
charge of the station for the same class and amount of time for the same period. See 
generally Licensee Responsibility Under Amendments to the Communications Act of 
1971, 47 F.C.C.2d 516 (1974). 
11 Section 315(a) does not impose upon any licensee an obligation to allow the "use" of 
its station by political candidates. Section 312(a)(7), however, does give the FCC author-
ity to revoke a license if a licensee willfully or repeatedly fails to allow reasonable access 
or to permit purchase of reasonablk amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station 
by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976). 
12 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976): 
13 Under § 315(a), the more generalized fairness doctrine requires the licensee to present 
contrasting viewpoints on issues of public importance, but allows the licensee to select the 
time, format, and spokesperson for presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues. 
See generally The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and Public 
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1(1974). 
" See generally T. EMERSON, TowARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-
15 (1966). 
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To invite such a situation where free time requirements would be 
uncontrolled and broadcast schedules interfered with is contrary 
to the economic interest of the broadcaster. The practical result 
has been to keep candidate air time to a minimum. Section 315(a) 
thus has a chilling effect on political coverage and ultimately 
disserves the electorate, since it goes against the First Amend-
ment interest of preserving "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas 
in which truth will ultimately prevail." 15 This suggests an im-
plicit, though equally important, set of competing interests: the 
broadcaster's desire to control programming and to maintain a 
profit, and the public's need to obtain as much information as 
possible about all candidates. 
IT. THE Aspen RULING 
In WJR' 6 and NBC, 17 the Commission maintained that only 
candidates' appearances that were "incidental to" the presenta-
tion of a bona fide news event would qualify for the on-the-spot 
news coverage exemption; under these rulings the intention, pur-
pose, and judgment of the broadcast licensee was deemed irrele-
vant.18 In Aspen, however, the Commission acknowledged that its 
initial interpretation of the legislative history that had accompa-
nied the enactment of the four exemptions to section 315(a) was 
in error because it had been based upon language stricken in 
conference from the final bill. 19 Moreover, the Commission noted 
other language in the legislative history which supported broad 
journalistic discretion by the licensee and rejected the idea that 
a news event cannot be exempt when the candidate's appearance 
is the central aspect of the broadcast event. 20 Thus, the Aspen 
ruling extended the definition of the bona fide news event exemp-
tion of section 315(a) to debates between qualified political candi-
dates initiated by nonbroadcast entities in a nonstudio setting 
and to press conferences conducted by the candidates themselves. 
The FCC required that the characterization of these programs as 
bona fide news events be based upon a good faith determination 
by the broadcaster, and that the broadcaster demonstrate no fa-
voritism in its presentation of these events.21 The Commission 
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See also Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
" See note 2 supra. 
17 See note 3 supra. 
" See NBC (WyckofO, 40 F.C.C. 370 (1962). 
,. Aspen Inst. Program on Communications and Soc'y, 55 F.C.C.2d 697, 703-04 (1975). 
,. Id. at 704-05. 
21 Id. at 708. 
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indicated that the policy underlying the change was to allow 
broadcasters to make "a fuller and more effective contribution to 
an informed electorate."22 The Commission's ruling was upheld 
on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia in Chisholm v. FCC. 23 
The immediate effect of the Aspen ruling was to permit as 
exempt programming the three broadcast debates in 1976 be-
tween Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford and the single broadcast 
debate between Walter Mondale and Robert Dole. In accordance 
with the FCC's interpretation, the debates were staged by a non-
broadcast entity, the League of Women Voters, in various nonstu-
dio settings, including the Palace of Fine Arts in San Francisco. 
These debates were, of course, produced with radio and television 
audiences in mind. Consequently, the three commercial networks 
were invited to participate in the planning of the debates, al-
though the League of Women Voters clearly controlled the pro-
cess in order to comply with the Aspen ruling. It selected the 
dates and locations, the format, and the panelists who questioned 
the candidates. The role of the networks was limited primarily to 
remote production and transmission, since the networks' exercise 
of broadcast journalism was preempted by the Commission's re-
quirement that exempt programming in the debate or press con-
ference categories must not present the opportunity for broad-
caster abuse. 2' 
Although the airing of these debates was a salutory accomplish-
ment, the infrequent staging of similar debates in subsequent 
elections, particularly at the state and local levels, has demon-
strated that the Aspen ruling is, at best, a stop-gap measure until 
legislative revision takes its place. The ruling is unsatisfactory 
primarily because it does not logically delineate what constitutes 
exempt programming. Thus far, the Aspen ruling has been ap-
plied only to debates or press conferences, but this limitation 
seems difficult to sustain. Other programming formats, such as 
a series of programs featuring candidates discussing the "great 
issues" of the campaign, may be equally suitable for informing 
the electorate. Under present law, however, a broadcaster cannot 
block out air time for such programming without triggering the 
mandatory equal time requirement.25 Furthermore, Aspen does 
22 Id. at 706. 
" There, the court deferred to the Commission's new interpretation, which it felt had 
"substantial support" in general legislative intent in spite of an "inconclusive" legislative 
history. 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court subsequently denied further 
review. Chisholm v. FCC, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). 
" Aspen Inst. Program on Communications and Soc'y, 55 F.C.C. 2d 697, 707 (1975). 
25 Id. 
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not address the situation where there is a multiplicity of candi-
dates, a situation that frequently occurs at the state and local 
levels. A broadcaster in this case would probably not plan an 
informational series about the issues because a "floodgate" could 
be created if all the candidates in the campaign demanded equal 
time. The Aspen ruling should be interpreted to permit a broad-
caster to exercise bona fide news judgment by covering any ap-
pearance of a candidate in any primary or general election cam-
paign. The FCC has remained silent to date in this regard. 
The practical limitations of the Aspen ruling further demon-
strate that it should not be accepted as the best solution in strik-
ing a balance between access of candidates to the airwaves and 
equality of treatment for all candidates. Nor should it be ac-
cepted as the best means of reconciling the journalistic and eco-
nomic interests of broadcasters with the informational needs of 
the viewing public. Since a nonbroadcast entity must first spon-
sor the event in a "neutral" setting before the broadcaster can 
make plans to cover it, the broadcaster must assume a passive or 
reactive role under Aspen. 
Although Aspen may currently provide an adequate solution on 
the national level, where groups such as the League of Women 
Voters have both personnel and money to stage debates in con-
formance with the ruling, there is no assurance that these re-
sources will continue to be available. 28 At a minimum, it strains 
the resources of nonbroadcast groups, forcing them to expend 
considerable energies and significant portions of their budgets to 
develop broadcasting expertise. Even assuming that there would 
continue to be no limitation on broadcasters donating money to 
non broadcast groups to sustain the production costs of debates, 27 
and that broadcasters would donate money in the absence of 
some control in producing the program, this is not the most effi-
cient solution. The broadcaster already has the production exper-
tise, the studios, and journalists who are familiar with the candi-
dates. The same result could therefore be achieved at a signifi-
cantly smaller cost if the producer were able to use these available 
20 Indeed, the League of Women Voters has recently indicated that it may not have 
sufficient funds to sponsor a series of debates during next year's presidential election. See 
New York Times, Oct. 24, 1979, § A, at 16, col. 1. 
27 The Federal Election Commission (FEC) proposed regulations in 1979 that would 
have prohibited broadcasters from contributing money or production services to sponsor 
debates. It had unsuccessfully proposed a similar measure in 1977. The latest proposal 
was also unsuccessful; it was blocked by a floor resolution introduced by the ranking 
majority and minority members of the Senate Rules Committee. Nevertheless, there 
remains the possibility that the FEC will, in the future, seek to restrict this source of 
funding. BROADCASTING, Sept. 10, 1979, at 32; Sept. 17, 1979, at 29. 
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resources. This efficiency rationale is even more urgent in state 
or local campaigns, where nonbroadcast entities may be unwilling 
or unable to assume the major responsibility of producing a series 
of media debates. 
III. LEGISLATIVE REFORM SUGGESTED BY Aspen 
A. Elimination of Section 315( a) 
The broadest legislative response to the Aspen ruling would be 
the complete elimination of section 315(a), so that.the only limi-
tation on broadcaster discretion would be the fairness doctrine. 28 
The House bill29 that would have rewritten the Communications 
Act of 1934, which recently was killed in the House Subcommit-
tee on Communications, favored the repeal of the equal opportun-
ities requirement, at least where free air time was at issue.30 This 
feeling, however, was not shared by the corresponding subcom-
mittee in the Senate. Two bills introduced there to amend the 
Communications Act of 1934 completely failed to deal with the 
political broadcasting area. 31 Regardless of these factors, a full 
repeal of section 315(a) is inadvisable. If it were fully repealed, 
the balance would be tilted too heavily toward the access ration-
ale without giving adequate attention to the principle favoring 
equality of treatment among all candidates seeking the same off-
ice. Moreover, full repeal would change only the standard for 
resolving disputes in the political broadcasting area: the fairness 
doctrine would then be used to evaluate, on a case-by-case bas1s, 
whether broadcasters presented contrasting viewpoints of candi-
dates receiving air time. The broadcaster would thereby receive 
greater journalistic license, but the cumbersome and frequently 
inconsistent rulings under the fairness doctrine suggest that ad-
ministrative chaos might well be the most immediately realized 
effect of such a reform measure.32 
28 For a discussion of § 315(a), see note 13 supra. 
29 H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Section 463, which covered equal opportuni-
ties for political candidates, was made applicable only where paid air time was involved. 
30 Under § 463(a)(l), the equal time requirement would only apply to purchased time. 
A Senate bill introduced last year also indicated sentiment favoring the repeal of§ 315(a). 
See S. 22, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1978). But as indicated in the text accompanying note 
31 infra, this sentiment was not present on the Senate side in the most recent session of 
Congress. 
31 See S. 611 & S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
32 Data froni the 1978 elections supports the argument that administrative chaos would 
result if the broader and more time consuming standard of the fairness doctrine replaced 
the equal opportunities requirement. For example, in September and October of 1978, the 
final two months of the campaign, the FCC's Complaints and Compliance Division re-
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B. Restriction of Section 315(a) to Presidential and Vice-
Presidential Candidates 
In 1960, on a one-time-only basis, Congress passed a joint reso-
lution suspending the application of the free time, equal oppor-
tunities provision to candidates for President and Vice President, 
although it did make clear that the general fairness doctrine re-
mained applicable to those. candidates.33 This resolution enabled 
the television networks to make time available for the Kennedy-
Nixon debates and demonstrated that suspension of section 
315(a) reduced the inhibitions of broadcasters against granting 
candidates free air time. 34 Politically, this reform measure may 
once again be the most acceptable to Congress because it is based 
on precedent and is limited to the most visible political race. 
Although this solution would smooth over the inconsistencies of 
the Aspen ruling, it would be applicable only to the presidential 
and vice-presidential candidates. Accordingly, the resurrection of 
this limited suspension of section 315(a) would not be very mean-
ingful for political broadcasting as a whole. 
C. Restriction of Section 315(a) to Statewide Elections 
Yet another possibility was suggested by an earlier draft of the 
House bill that rewrote the Communications Act of 1934.35 This 
bill presented an approach that keyed the exemptions of section 
315(a) to the office being sought. Under this proposal, the equal 
opportunities provision would have been made inapplicable to all 
candidates for President, Vice President, United States Senator, 
and to candidates for any other office for which a statewide elec-
tion is held (e.g., Governor or Attorney General).38 The theory 
behind this proposal was that since there are many broadcast 
stations available in such races, any abuse by an individual sta-
tion in "freezing out" certain candidates would have minimal 
impact. This incremental approach would have expanded the 
scope of reform that Congress had chosen in the past. Ultimately, 
ceived 2,810 calls from broadcasters requesting help in interpreting the equal opportuni-
ties provisions and from candidates complaining about broadcasters. This figure does not 
include the number of complaints and inquiries received in the mail. BROADCASTING, Nov. 
6, 1978, at 7. 
33 See Act of Aug. 24, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-677, 74 Stat. 554 (1960). 
" Kennedy and Nixon, for example, received much more free time from networks than 
Johnson and Goldwater received in 1964, when § 315(a) was again in full force: almost 
forty hours in 1960 vs. less than five hours in 1964. R. MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE: 
THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON AMERICAN POLITICS 285-86 (1968). 
33 H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
38 Id. § 439(a)(l)(B). 
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however, it was an inadequate solution because it was both over-
inclusive and underinclusive. The proposal failed to take into 
account either large urban areas where there are numerous sta-
tions to cover non-statewide races37 or sparsely populated states 
where there are few stations available to cover statewide races.38 
Moreover, the federal office that is closest to the voter's geo-
graphic interest, United States Representative, was not covered 
by this plan, since House races are determined in individual dis-
tricts rather than throughout the state as a whole. 
D. Restriction of Section 315(a) to "Significant" Candidacies 
A broader restriction of the scope of section 315(a) that shifts 
the emphasis from the office sought to the importance of the 
candidacy is perhaps more desirable. The present equal oppor-
tunities scheme applies to all legally qualified candidates. Under 
many state laws, it is easy for a person to qualify for a place on 
the ballot and thus claim the status of a "legally qualified candi-
date."39 An abundance offringe parties (e.g., Vegetarian, Prohibi-
tion, Socialist Labor)40 provides a disincentive for broadcasters to 
" For example, the metropolitan area (ADI) of New York City has sixteen television 
stations, and the Los Angeles ADI has fifteen television stations. BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 
1978, at B-41, 50 (1978). 
n In contrast, the entire state of Nevada has nine television stations and New Hamp-
shire's total is eight. Id. at B-116. 
st The Supreme Court has been an influential force in this area. For example, three of 
its decisions during the past two decades have, on constitutional grounds, lowered the 
threshold for appearing on the ballot as a candidate in California, Texas, and Ohio, 
respectively. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 
(1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
•• This is not fanciful. In 1960, at the time of Nixon-Kennedy debates and the suspen-
sion of the equal time requirement, there were fourteen other candidates for the office of 
President on the ballots in several states: C. Benton Coiner, Conservative Party of Vir-
ginia; Merritt Curtis, Constitution Party; Lar Daly, Tax Cut Party; Dr. R.L. Decker, 
Prohibition Party; Farrell Dobbs, Socialist Worker and Farmers Party, Utah; Orval E. 
Faubus, National States Rights Party; Symon Gould, American Vegetarian Party; Eric 
Hass, Socialist Labor Party, Industrial Government Party, Minnesota; Clennon King, 
Afro-American Unity Party; Henry Krajemski, American Third Party; J. Bracken Lee, 
Conservative Party of New Jersey; Whitney Harp Slocom, Greenback Party; William 
Lloyd Smith, American Beat Consensus; Charles Sullivan, Constitution Party of Texas. 
See Amicus Curiae Brief for League of Women Voters, Common Cause, and Aspen Inst. 
in Opposition to Certiorari at 6 n.4, Chisholm v. FCC, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). In 1964, the 
cost estimates were $2,500,000 if the networks agreed to give equal time to seven other 
candidates because of a telecast by President Johnson. Goldwater v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Case No. 18963 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Brief for Federal Communications 
Commission at 19). The figure would be much higher today. See also Political Broadcast-
ing - 1970: Hearings on H.R. 13721, H.R. 13722, H.R. 13751, H.R. 13752, H.R. 13935, 
H.R. 14047, H.R. 14511, and S. 3637 before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power 
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) 
(statement of FCC Chairman Burch). 
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grant free time to the significant candidates, since one non-
exempt appearance triggers the equal opportunities provision for 
all other candidates seeking the same office. Narrowing the defi-
nition of a "legally qualified candidate"41 to significant candida-
cies would ameliorate the problem. A percentage based on peti-
tion signatures could be used to determine whether a given candi-
date was "significant." However, this is an expensive and time-
consuming process that should generally be avoided. As a practi-
cal matter, the only way to evaluate the importance of a candi-
date would be to consider his or her party's showing in the last 
election. A low percentage such as one or two percent could be 
used. The requisite information would be readily available in 
public records. Under this proposal, the definition of a "legally 
qualified candidate" would be further limited to apply only to 
free time. Since section 315(a) has caused no practical problems 
in its application to paid time, there is no reason to deny any 
candidate the opportunity for equal treatment when paid time is 
involved. 
Under this scheme, not all candidates would receive equal 
treatment when they demand free time. However, there appears 
to be little benefit from insuring equal treatment for candidates 
whose public support is virtually insignificant and there is the 
potential detriment of shutting off vigorous debate.42 
The troublesome limitation of this proposal is that, as a practi-
cal matter, it would necessitate limiting the equal opportunities 
provision to candidates in general, partisan elections, because 
candidates in primaries often do not have any prior quantifiable 
base of support. Additionally, since primaries involve intra-party 
selection, a determination of a party's support in the previous 
primary election would be illogical. Primaries have become an 
increasingly important component of the electoral process, and 
success in the primaries often means success in gaining a party's 
nomination for the general election. Contrary to the practice of 
twenty years ago, most delegates to political conventions are 
" The FECA campaign funding standards, 2 U.S.C. § 431(b)(1976), are inapposite. 
Since the FECA standard for "legally qualified candidate" is looser than that of the FCC, 
there is no reason to articulate it as a model; if anything, the existing standard is too 
broad, so that an excessive number of "candidates" could become eligible for equal 
time, resulting in a reduction of air time for political broadcasting. 
" Where there are significant third-party candidacies, such as John Lindsay running 
as the Liberal Party candidate for mayor in New York City or James Buckely running as 
the Conservative Party senatorial candidate in New York, broadcasters would also have 
to afford equal time periods for non-exempt appearances under this plan. The views of 
fringe candidates, of course, would still be presented under the fairness doctrine, but this 
matter would be within the broadcaster's discretion, e.g., NBC program with all the fringe 
candidates given five minutes each to state their views. 
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picked by rank-and-file voters in primaries rather than by profes-
sional politicians. For example, of the 3,331 delegates to be se-
lected for the 1980 Democratic Convention, over two-thirds -
enough delegates to nominate a candidate - will be chosen in 
direct primaries. A similar situation will be applicable at the 
Republican Convention. 43 Voters in primary elections deserve 
exposure to the candidates and their issues, yet a percentage 
scheme that might promote exposure in a general, partisan elec-
tion would fail to do so for the primaries. 
E. Expansion of Exempt Programming Categories 
A much simpler and preferable approach which can be made 
applicable to both primaries and general, partisan elections 
would be a legislative revision of section 315(a) that follows the 
lead of the Aspen ruling and further expands the exempt pro-
gramming categories.44 
First, there should be an exemption for any joint or "back-to-
back" appearances of candidates. This would allow a station or 
a network to air a series of "great issues" programs during the 
campaign without triggering the equal opportunities obligation. 
Second, an exemption is needed to cover any other program of a 
news or journalistic character that meets all of the following cri-
teria: (i) the program is regularly scheduled; (ii) its content, for-
mat, and participants are determined by the licensee or network; 
(iii) it explores conflicting views on a current issue of public im-
portance; (iv) it is not designed to serve the political advantage 
of any legally qualified candidate. This provision would allow for 
broadcaster-produced debates45 and for the first time would allow 
candidates to appear on journalistic programs like "The Advo-
cates," not to advance their candidacies, but to discuss an impor-
tant topical issue. 
43 Hunt, Endorsement Race is Heated But Means Little, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1979, at 
22, col. 2. 
" The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has expanded the 
FCC's Aspen ruling slightly, so as to permit the later airing, within twenty-four hours, of 
a prerecorded debate or press conference if the program otherwise conforms with Aspen. 
Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 76-1878 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 
11, 1978). But given the great deference that the courts have afforded to the Commission's 
judgment in evaluating the scope of§ 315(a) exemptions, judicial resolution of remaining 
ambiguities does not seem promising. An example of this deference is described in note 
23 and accompanying text supra. See also note 7 supra. 
" The licensee, of course, would be able to affect the public's image of a candidate by 
its decision as to which candidates would be admitted to a debate and which would be 
relegated to later appearances. But this is true today in many situations. See, e.g., In re 
Messrs. William F. Ryan and Paul O'Dwyer, 14 F.C.C.2d 633 (1968). It is especially true 
in how much time is devoted to candidates in the all-important news programs. 
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The obligation of the broadcaster to comply with the fairness 
doctrine by presenting contrasting viewpoints on controversial 
issues of public importance should provide adequate protection 
for potential abuses. Moreover, the 1960 data compiled during the 
limited equal time suspension•1 and the generally responsible 
manner in which broadcasters have covered elections in programs 
that are covered by the existing exemptions indicate that the 
potential for abuse is minimal. 
These exemptions should cover both primaries and the general 
election, since debates and similar issue-oriented programming 
formats at each stage can provide valuable information about 
candidates to the electorate. Neither exemption would preclude 
nonbroadcast groups from producing or sponsoring broadcast 
debates; rather, broadcasters would finally be allowed to partici-
pate actively in debates if they could act as the better catalyst 
under the circumstances. The result of this change would be an 
increase in overall air time for candidates to discuss the issues 
and greater utilization of debates and similar innovative pro-
gramming formats. 
CONCLUSION 
As the 1980 elections approach, Congress should take a careful 
look toward revising section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 
1934.47 The approaches discussed here are not exhaustive and 
other options may arise during the legislative process. But they 
suggest a viable way to satisfy the competing policy considera-
tions to a greater extent than they are at present. Absent efforts 
to increase broadcaster discretion, the only real alternative is to 
accept the arbitrary and unsatisfactory categories that have been 
created. 
The FCC, as the recipient of congressional authority under the 
Communications Act of 1934, has already responded in part to 
the problems created by the equal opportunities provision in its 
Aspen ruling. Although this ruling may be further refined at the 
agency level, •s the better approach is congressional revision. Con-
gress is clearly in the best position to implement broad policies 
for political broadcasting. It can fine-tune the delicate balance it 
" See note 34 supra. 
" Revision in this area should be limited to equal opportunities for free time, since 
§ 315{a), as noted, has caused no practical problems in its application to paid time. 
•• Recently, the National Association of Broadcasters began drafting a petition request• 
ing the Commission to revisit its Aspen ruling so as to give it a broader construction. 
BROADCASTING, Oct. 29, 1979, at 7. 
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sought to establish when it promulgated section 315(a) between 
a better informed electorate and the deprivation of the opportun-








Jane E. Helppie 
Administrative Editors 
Jonathan I. Golomb 
Andrew J. Miller 
EDITORIAL BOARD 
Editor-in-Chief 
Philip H. Hecht 
Executive Articles Editors 
Katharine B. Rodriguez 
David A. Rabin 
Note Editors 
Harold Mead Hickok 
Fredric Bryan Lesser 
Research and Development Editor 
Jonathan S. Brenner 
Lenell Nussbaum 
Alan R. Perry, Jr. 
Philip M. Schradle 
James A. Bums, Jr. 
Jeffrey M. Eisen 
David G. Beauchamp 
Richard F. Cauley 
Richard M. Cieri 
John D. Croll 
John W. Finger 
Mark Farrar Foley 
Nadezhda Freedman 
Marianne P. Gaertner 
Stuart L. Gasner 
SENIOR STAFF 
Michael N. Finger 
Paula R. Latovick 
JUNIOR STAFF 
David M. Lesser 
Robert E. Spatt 
John C. Grabow Andrew J. Lensink 
David D. Gregg James A. Morgulec 
Kathryn A. Hamilton Dale K. Nichols 
Stanley M. Klem Darlene M. Nowak 
Charles Howland Knauss Gary C. Robb 
Roberta S. Kochman Jose M. Sariego 
Michael J. Kump Lawrence A. Serlin 
Bradford W. Kuster Karen K. Shinevar 
Elizabeth A. Zatina 
FACULTY ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
Lee C. Bollinger, Chairman 
Thomas E. Kauper 
BUSINESS MANAGER 
Kathleen M. Maher 
Frank R. Kennedy 
Published by the University of Michigan Law School 

